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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research evaluation has been an essential practice of the regular functioning 
of the research system (Zuckerman and Merton, 1971; Cole and Cole, 
1973). Reputational competition (Merton, 1957; Ben-David, 1971, 1972; 
Whitley, 2000; Dasgupta and David, 1994) has been shaped by mechanisms 
of evaluation of research mostly identified with the practice of peer review 
for journals’ publications (Campanario, 1998 a, b; Cole, 1998). Some of 
these practices for publishing papers or awarding prizes have been extended 
to the allocation of the funding for research from governments or 
intermediary organisations (Chubin and Hackett, 1991; Cole, Rubin and 
Cole, 1978).  
More recently, state research evaluation systems (RES)1 have been 
developed in a number of countries in the context of new public 
management practices, scarce public funds and increasing accountability 
requests (Georghiou, 1995), and the allocation of resources for 
organizations and programs has become more and more connected to the 
evaluation of research (Geuna and Martin, 2003; Liefner, 2003). 
Additionally, the dominant ex ante or project appraisal approaches have 
been complemented by the institutionalisation of retrospective ex post 
evaluations of research performance2, as the papers by Kneller, Cozzens 
ands others in this volume discuss. 
                                                          
1 We understand research evaluation system as the ensemble of practices and institutional arrangements in a 
country mediating between scientific quality controls and research policies. 
2 For a recent review of different evaluation practices associated to R&D see the work by Luke Georghiou and 
Philippe Laredo for the OECD (2006). 
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In terms of the overall governance of the public research system, 
evaluation carries out two main functions. On the one hand, it can be 
considered as a “steering or management tool”, that is, as an instrument for 
organising and managing research activities (Callon, Laredo and Mustar, 
1995). As such, evaluation may be directed to research related organisations 
(universities, research centres, and management institutions) in order to 
improve their functioning; or it can be oriented to policy making, through 
the evaluation of science and technology (S&T) programs, and to improve 
research policies.  
On the other hand, along with the steering function, research evaluation 
can be used in a distributive way whereby it is used to allocate different 
kinds of rewards and resources among different types of actors - individuals, 
groups or organisations - to improve their research performance. These 
incentives may be economic (grants, salary bonuses) and/or symbolic 
(reputation and prestige). Research evaluation as a distributive instrument 
can, then, affect the funding of research organisations, research projects, or 
the allocation of rewards to individual researchers. In some countries, we 
find the combination and integration of both functions in single funding 
instruments, while in others they are separated.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the institutionalisation of the Spanish 
RES in the context of the transformation of the research organizational 
field3 (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez, 2007) and the public research 
system (PRS). The co-evolution of the changing PRS and RES is 
particularly interesting in Spain because of the effects of increasing political 
decentralisation and the importance of individual evaluations rather than 
organisational ones. The limited financial resources for research of Spanish 
universities and their dependence on the success of individual researchers in 
obtaining research grants through competitive bidding has meant that they 
have weak strategic capabilities4, especially in comparison with those of 
Australian, British and US research organisations.  
More specifically, we deal with the following questions: 
- What explains the emergence in Spain of a RES focused on 
individuals rather than on organisations?  
- Why is research evaluation at the level of organisation marginally 
connected with research funding? 
- How has the decentralisation of science and technology policy 
affected the RES? 
- How has the changing RES affected the organisation and functioning 
of the PRS? 
                                                          
3 We borrow the concept of “organisational field” from the institutional approaches of organisational theory (see 
for example DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
4 We recall the issue because the negative consequences for performance of highly autonomous scientists in 
loosely coordinated organizational settings (Pelz and Andrews, 1966). 
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During the last decade, research evaluation has become seen as essential 
for the steering of the public research system and there has been 
considerable effort directed to the different actors across the system to 
encourage the adoption of evaluative habits and structures. Nevertheless, we 
suggest that the evaluation focus continues to be at the individual level of 
researchers and research groups with minor developments regarding 
organisational and program evaluation.  
The chapter is organised as follows: the next section describes the basic 
institutional features of the Spanish academic system and its research 
funding regime. This is taken as a point of reference in order to analyse, in 
section 3, the institutionalisation process and characteristics of RES, 
including some of the explanatory factors that account for these 
developments. Section 4 present a summary of the arguments and deals with 
the feedback effects that new trends and institutional arrangements of the 
RES have had on the public research system. 
2. THE ACADEMIC SYSTEM: GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING 
For the purpose of this chapter we understand the Spanish academic system 
to be composed of two different subsystems: the universities (represented in 
the Frascati Manual for R&D statistics as “Higher Education”) and the 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC), which is the largest 
the Public Research Centre (included in the R&D Statistics under the label 
of “Government”). In 2004, higher education represented 29,5% of the total 
R&D expenditures, meaning 0.32% of the Spanish GDP and 51% of the 
researchers (FTE) and 39% of the R&D personnel. The government sector 
as a whole represented 16% of the total R&D expenditures, meaning 0.17% 
of the Spanish GDP, 17% of the researchers (FTE) and 17% of the R&D 
personnel; and the CSIC represented approximately one third of the 
Government sector. 
Two single words characterize the Spanish academic system over the last 
25 years: Growth and change. On the one hand, numbers have more than 
doubled in the main variables of the system, such as the number of 
universities, professors, lecturers, students enrolled, graduate and doctoral 
degrees granted, etc. On the other hand, universities, and to a lesser extent 
public research centres, have significantly changed their way of governance 
and functioning.  
2.1. Size and governance 
In 2004 there were 69 universities in Spain, 21 of them private. However in 
terms of the number of students enrolled and the number of professors and 
lecturers, the public universities represent around 92%. The 48 public 
universities had almost 88,000 professors and lecturers, among them 50,500 
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with the condition of civil servants –permanent staff- engaged in research 
and teaching to 1.36 million enrolled students; the public universities 
produced around 182,000 graduates and 7,100 PhDs in 2003/2004. 
Some historical figures provide a clear picture of the growth of the 
system. In 1983, the number of universities was 33 (3 of them private and 
owned by the church5), with almost 31,000 professors and lecturers, 
engaged in teaching to 700,000 enrolled students; the public universities 
produced almost 80,000 graduates and 1,900 PhDs per year. 
However, transformation has not been just the result of the growing 
demand of the Spanish society for higher education and the increase of 
public budgets for education; changes were also the result of the 
transformation of the university in two important dimensions: Firstly, the 
universities have moved from “bureaucratic centralism” dominant at the 
Dictatorship times to a “self-regulation” mode of governance (Sánchez-
Ferrer, 1997) and, secondly, from being just teaching universities, they have 
evolved into  a model of the university that has, simultaneously, set up 
research and third mission activities (García and Sanz-Menéndez, 2003).  
The Spanish 1978 Constitution recognised the autonomy of universities 
(Spanish Constitution, art 27.10), while the 1983 University Reform Act 
(LRU) defined the constitutional arrangements for university governance, 
management and functioning. Although universities were defined as self-
governing bodies, they have been highly dependent on public funds; 
therefore, despite the high level of “autonomy” the universities were rather 
poor in financial terms and consequently quite dependent on the political 
authorities.6 Additionally, the legal reforms enabled the universities to 
recruit and select their own academic staff and to appoint, after an 
“examination procedure” managed by the university, new professors with 
civil servant status (Mora, 2001). 
Apart from the academic staff recruitment procedures, the governance of 
universities has also followed quite autonomous mechanisms, developed 
under principles established by the 1983 Universities Act but implemented 
by the specific procedures in each university (trough their own Statutes. 
University authorities (rectors, vice-rectors and deans) are elected by their 
own constituencies (that include permanent professors, temporary lecturers, 
administrative personnel and students) and their “responsiveness” to society 
depend basically on their will and the “financial pressure” that governments 
could exert. 
Between 1985 and 1996, as part of the decentralization or federalization 
of Spain, supervision and control of the universities were transferred to the 
                                                          
5 Until the early 90s the only private universities existing in Spain were those related with the Church, a privilege 
that they got  in the times of Francoist dictatorship. 
6 Estimates of aggregated income of universities coming directly through regular transfers from public budgets 
(either regional or national) amount 78% of the total (Hernández Armenteros, 2004).  
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different regional governments.7 Additionally, some regional governments 
have created new public universities, either to transform former “colleges” 
located in some provinces into universities or from the scratch, in order to 
reduce the students’ enrolment pressure on the old universities. In any case, 
the growth of universities in provincial capitals has become strongly related 
to local and regional politics. 
While most aspects of the governance arrangements of universities have 
been stable for almost two decades, some significant changes have taken 
place in their regulatory environment with the approval of a new 
Universities Act (LOU) in 2001. This Act represented a significant increase 
in the regulatory powers of regional governments and many regional 
governments have approved Regional Universities Acts since then. In fact, 
the 2001 Universities Act gave legal recognition to an emerging process of 
differentiation of relationships between the regional authorities and their 
universities. Given the diversity in the capabilities of regional governments 
to implement steering mechanisms, a broad variety of outcomes is likely to 
emerge.8 
Under the new regulations, the Chancellors of universities are elected 
following universal democratic rules; and consequently the university 
management structure is often seeking re-election taking care of the interest 
and demands of their constituencies. Whereas this change represented a 
move towards increased university autonomy and increased internal 
accountability, the 2001 Universities Act also introduced a significant 
change in the mechanisms of access to the civil servant status for university 
professors or to get a university contract, namely, national habilitation and 
accreditation respectively. The reasons for this re-centralised quality control 
with respect to the recruitment of academic staff lies in one of the side 
effects of the decentralization of selection established in 1983 Universities 
Act, that is, a high degree of inbreeding and the consolidation of internal 
labour markets dynamics within university departments (Cruz-Castro and 
Sanz-Menéndez, 2006). 
In addition to the universities, research is conducted by CSIC, which is 
the largest public research organisation. This is an umbrella organization – 
similar to the Max Planck Society in Germany or the CNRS in France - with 
more than a 100 institutes all over Spain, more than 10,000 employees and 
2,500 tenured scientists (Sanz-Menéndez and Cruz-Castro, 2003). In 
contrast with the Universities, the CSIC has not been transferred to the 
                                                          
7 The national government only has direct control and supervision capabilities over the UNED (a distance learning 
university like the Open University in UK) and UIMP (a “summer courses university” that do not yet provide 
degrees). 
8 There are 8 Regions  (Basque Country, Balearic Islands, Asturias, Cantabria, Navarre, Castile-La Mancha, La 
Rioja, Extremadura) each of them supervising only one university; in those regions in many occasions, the 
Chancellor or Rector of the University is a more relevant person in the region than the President of the Regional 
Government. Bigger regions with more than one public university are Andalusia (10 universities), Catalonia (8 
universities), Madrid (6 universities) and some others. 
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regional authorities. Despite the fact that CSIC authorities, appointed by the 
Minister of Education and Science, have a significant discretionary power of 
allocation of resources, they also try to get support and consensus from their 
researchers and institutes. The CSIC has been – until the seventies - the 
“reservoir” of public research in Spain (OECD, 1964), always in strong 
interaction with university. It is different from other public research centres 
(PRCs) for several reasons. Firstly, it is not mission-oriented; secondly, only 
researchers with a PhD can obtain tenure as an academic staff; and thirdly, 
CSIC researchers are involved in the competition for the same research 
funds, and they are also the only ones subjected to the same evaluation 
systems, as university professors.  
2.2. Funding  
In the context of the formal autonomy of universities and researchers to 
pursue their own research objectives, the way in which funding is organized 
is a critical element in evaluating the ability of governments to steer 
research activities (Braun, 1993; Whitley, 2003). The standard Anglo-Saxon 
literature on the relation between science and politics usually interprets the 
increasing relevance of competitive project-based funding for research as a 
signal of the demand of the authorities to the research community for more 
responsiveness to the programmatic research goals defined by the 
government. However, the Spanish situation does not fit this model because 
neither universities nor even the public research centres obtain significant 
amounts of stable block grant funding for research.  
At the time of the transfer of the universities’ control from national 
Government to the regional ones, the funding system was relatively 
homogeneous. It followed an incremental line item budgeting, in which 
each single item of expenditure of the budget was increased with respect to 
the budget of the previous years, but a system based on a formula model 
was emerging, where the main criteria were teaching loads (number of 
registered students) and the numbers of teaching staff; with almost no block 
grant funding for research. 
Today, university funding has been decentralised to the regional 
authorities, so the situation in each university varies depending on the 
strategies and priorities of regional government. The annual transfer for 
university funding is included in the Regional Government Annual Budget 
that the regional parliament approve at the end of each year. Due to the very 
different political priority assigned by the different regional authorities to 
the higher education institutions and research policy, the mechanisms used 
by governments to finance universities are quite diverse. Incremental line 
item budgeting has been replaced by two types of models, which in many 
cases go together: formula models and contractual arrangements (González 
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López, 2006). The first one is usually based on different combinations of 
students’ enrolment, size of the staff and other numerical data. In 
contractual agreements (Contratos Programa) the funds are usually linked 
to the accomplishment of goals or requisites previously agreed.   
CSIC funding from the government has traditionally followed an 
incremental line item budgeting. In the budgets of 2005 and 2006 a political 
decision to increase R&D budgets has meant a very significant increase of 
more than 20%. This increase has opened the possibility, along with new 
legal changes, of developing a model of relationship based on contractual 
agreements with performance indicators. In late 2005 and early 2006 the 
first steeps in that direction have been taken (Fernandez de Labastida, 2005) 
and a legal change is on the way. 
In the absence of any significant block grant funding for research 
activities, university professors and CSIC researchers need to obtain 
research funds through competition from funding institutions (national or 
regional) or though contracts with companies. In the mid eighties a national 
external funding system for research in universities and CSIC was 
established9 for the first time, in a model labelled as a “quasi research 
council” (García and Sanz-Menéndez, 2005). This model has distinctive 
characteristics as regards Research Councils as we know them. First, the 
majority of the funding bodies depend directly on Ministries, and the Heads 
of these bodies are normally political appointees. Secondly, these 
organisations lack major administrative capacities since they are weak 
bureaucracies with little permanent staff and broadly populated by the 
agents of the system: the researchers. Finally, and most importantly, the 
quasi-research councils operate in a context of unclear boundaries between 
principals and agents, but they can, nevertheless, enjoy a high degree of 
institutional stability along the years.  
The primary mechanism for government implementation of Spanish 
R&D policy has been through the funding of research projects, and this has 
accounted for most of the non-specific objective funds earmarked for the 
public research system. These budget funds are awarded through an annual 
public call for proposals, usually for 3-year research projects. It is in this 
project-based context that the Spanish type of research evaluation has been 
strongly associated with the allocation of funds.  
Additionally, the regionalisation of the country has produced a distinctive 
feature of the research funding system: multilevel dynamics (Sanz-
Menéndez and Cruz-Castro, 2005). The increased involvement of regional 
authorities in providing competitive funding for research has increased the 
pluralism in the system with respect to the definition of research objectives, 
without reducing, however, the problems that Spanish research institutions 
                                                          
9 For a deep analysis of the institutional construction of the Spanish science and technology policy see Sanz-
Menéndez (1997). 
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and organizations have in defining strategic behaviour and solving the 
collective action problems of their researchers. 
Some tension and conflict between the scientific and political rationales 
of research resources distribution among research organisations can occur. 
Although the formal organisational autonomy of the universities with 
respect to the government and the political system has been reinforced over 
time in terms of self-governance, there is significant financial dependence of 
the universities on their regional authorities. When the research 
organisations and political arenas are too close, there is always a possibility 
of a kind of practice of allocation of resources based on interests groups’ 
politics, rather than on the scientific logic of the best performance or on a 
more explicit managerial approach. The political distributive rationale at the 
regional level tends to be egalitarian rather than discriminating between 
research organizations, however the aggregate effect of the 17 different 
regional policies could produced differentiation. 
3. INSTITUTIONALISATION PROCESSES AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SPANISH RES 
In the mid-1980s, together with the dramatic growth in the budget 
earmarked for competitive R&D funding, there was a considerable increase 
in the use of peer review in funding allocation decisions. Research 
evaluation arrangements were institutionalised in 1986 by means of the Act 
for the Promotion and General Coordination of Scientific and Technical 
Research (Science Act). Under this Act and its developments, the funding of 
research activities was organised around a National R&D Plan including: 
(1) targeted research, articulated around priority programmes, and basic 
research articulated by the programme for the General Promotion of 
Knowledge (PGC)10; and (2) reliance on peer review as the legitimate 
selection mechanism prompted by the creation of the National Agency for 
Evaluation and Foresight (ANEP), managed by the research community.  
Overall the existing funding regime is basically a project-based one, with 
some elements of a programmatic regime; however the influence of the 
academic research community in the selection of national priorities was and 
is quite determinant. In addition to high degree of competition, there is a 
significant degree of autonomy in pursuing research objectives, even in the 
context of national S&T priorities. The basic features of the Spanish 
research-funding regime and some interaction with the RES are summarised 
in table 1. 
                                                          
10 The structure of the National R&D Plan, organised in targeted and non-targeted programmes, was actually 
rhetorical. It did not have—ex ante—any resources assigned by areas, but waited for the demand for funding and 
the quality of the proposals.  
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Table 1. Basic features of the research-funding regime in Spain 
- High university political autonomy but budgets largely determined 
externally and mainly dependent of teaching loads or students’ 
enrolment 
- Essentially, a peer review project-based funding regime, with 
elements of programmatic regime (Whitley, in this volume) 
- University strategic management of research has limited impact on 
research groups, as compared to scientific peer’s pressures and the 
steering of research towards priorities set up by funding bodies  
- Increasing diversity of funding sources for research as result of the 
regional authorities involvement in science policy 
- Public research centres have had historically less autonomy, and 
greater presence of block grant funding than universities, but this has 
changed over time  
- High variance of evaluation standards across scientific fields, but 
with some trends towards convergence 
3.1. Institutional arrangements of the research evaluation system (RES) 
The 1983 Universities Act represented an almost complete transfer of the 
responsibilities of selection and access to the civil service of university 
professors to the universities themselves. In contrast, the arrangements of 
research evaluation set up with the 1986 Science Act were associated with a 
more centralised model of managing science and technology policy. In fact, 
analysing the underlying logic of both Acts one could say that University 
Reform Act was shaped by a liberal and self-organised model of 
responsibilities, while the Science Act had a much more planning oriented 
and interventionist model, even shaped by Bernalist models of science 
policy. 
In the early times of the Spanish S&T policy in the eighties, the emerging 
academic elite associated to the new socialist government was very much 
concerned about the procedures of allocation competitive funding (Sanz-
Menéndez, 1997), which in the past had been mainly based on the 
hierarchical approach of the senior professors in each field. The creation of 
an independent evaluation space, managed by scientists, as a first step into 
the project funding process, became a clear objective. The reforms that took 
place in the mid-80s considered the set-up of evaluation structures as a 
priority in order to build a coherent S&T policy in Spain. The main focus 
was in developing a peer-review system guaranteed by the State (Sanz-
Menéndez, 1995) as a mechanism for research evaluation directed to the 
allocation of public research funds.  
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3.1.1. ANEP 
A unique institutional arrangement was adopted in Spain with the 
establishment of the ANEP (National Agency for Evaluation and Foresight). 
The ANEP was created in the CICYT -the inter-ministerial political-
planning body in charge of the R&D policy- but with autonomous scientific 
management. Its mission was concerned with “the scientific and technical 
evaluation of entities and research groups that participate in the 
implementation of programmes and projects of the National R&D Plan, the 
proposals of both R&D actors and operators, and the monitoring of results 
(outputs and outcomes) that could be produced in the development of those 
programmes and projects”.11 The ANEP had also the mission of developing 
foresight activities in scientific research and technological development, but 
in practice the overload of work and its weak organisational capabilities 
precluded a serious development of any activity other than ex ante project 
appraisal. Already in 1995 the bulk of ANEP activity was scientific and 
technical evaluation for project selection and funding, general scientific and 
technical assessment and technical advice to political bodies, with single 
cases of evaluation of research organisations (Sanz-Menéndez, 1995). 
The evaluation and selection of project applications is implemented as a 
two-stage process in which two or three individual peers, using a mail 
procedure, make a first assessment of the submissions; then, a panel of 
experts makes the final funding decisions. In fact, ANEP does not control 
the final approval of the projects reviewed because the ANEP reviews are 
just an input, a relevant one, in the process of selection. The overall project 
funding process was identified as “dual”, because after the individual peer 
reviews were done by the ANEP, the “priority”, adequacy to the research 
objectives and priorities of the National Plan, was stated by a panel from the 
funding body. Just to provide an idea of the effects of its activity we can 
mention that approximately 50% of R&D projects evaluated for the 
Directorate General for Research were rejected (García and Sanz-
Menéndez, 2005). 
The Spanish peer review model used for funding research has been based 
upon two critical “roles”, usually filled by academics in part-time jobs: (1) 
the coordinator of each scientific area, appointed by the ANEP; and (2) the 
manager of each scientific programme at the R&D funding units. 
Coordinators select the reviewers from a pool of academics; this selection is 
based on a mix of criteria such as scientific specialisation, research 
expertise, etc. . Programme managers are responsible for appointing the 
panel of experts (between 8 and 20) that will complement the assessment of 
each project, to which they assign scores. These new scores, together with 
those from ANEP, support the final decision on whether or not the proposal 
is funded. The evaluation criteria are the usual ones: contribution of the 
                                                          
11 Decree RD 415/1987, 6th March, “Organic structure of the Permanent Commission of the CICYT”. 
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proposal, research design, quality of methodology and past performance of 
the principal investigator and research team.  
The ANEP, fifteen years after its creation, continues to be an 
administrative unit of the Ministry of Education and Science, under the 
dependence of the State Secretary of Universities and Research, and 
organises its research evaluation activity autonomously from the 
management of the R&D funding programmes and bodies. Funding bodies, 
internal to the Ministry of Education and Science or external –other 
Ministerial funding or Regional governments-, often request the support of 
the ANEP in the evaluation of the project proposals or the approval of 
individual fellowships. 
3.1.2. CNEAI 
The second institutional element of the Spanish RES emerged in the late 
eighties: It was the establishment of ex post research performance 
evaluation procedures of individual researchers and the creation of the 
National Commission for the Evaluation of Research Activity (CNEAI). 
This move must be seen as part of the institutionalisation of individual 
incentives and rewards for research activities. The 1983 Universities Act 
(art. 11) approved the possibility for university professors (and latter on the 
Science Act did the same for the CSIC researchers) to get additional 
personal income (despite their civil service status) from contract research 
with private entities.  
A response to the movement of many university professors into “contract 
research” was the attempt to increase the wages of those working mainly 
with publicly funded projects, and to reward their publications’ profile. In 
1989 government approved a voluntary-based system of periodical (every 
six years) evaluation of individual research outcomes12, and the construction 
of an institution dedicated to that task: the CNEAI. 
The CNEAI was institutionalised as a mechanism for evaluating 
academic careers and the research performance of tenured researchers. It 
was organised as a way of providing incentives for research activities. The 
rewards were small salary increases for university professors and CSIC 
researchers in exchange for the recognition of good research performance 
(reflected in a positive evaluation). Once a year, tenured academics and 
researchers may submit five contributions to a panel of peers that examine 
their career on a six-year period base. The recognition of these six-year 
periods of research activity leads to an automatic increase in salary, and it 
more and more constitutes a reputational legitimising element for the 
researcher as well (Sanz-Menéndez, 1995).  
                                                          
12 Amazingly a similar system of complementing the wages of the academics was established in Mexico in the 
same years, the National System of Researchers (Sistema Nacional de Investigadores) (see Schoijet and 
Worthington, 1993, despite their confusing interpretation of the system). 
12               LAURA CRUZ-CASTRO AND LUIS SANZ-MENÉNDEZ 
 
The original idea was simply to reward research performance, mainly 
based on the concept of “contributions”, and mostly reflected in the 
publication of papers in international journals. The evaluation procedure is 
organised in 11 large research domains and the examination of the 
contributions submitted is made by a small set of publicly appointed 
experts. 
The institutional arrangement of the CNEAI is quite soft, as it involves 
experts appointed by the Minister of Education and Science and 
representatives of the Regional Governments. This evaluation mechanism is 
arranged by the national authorities, but the small increases of wages of 
university professors is paid by the regional governments, because of the 
institutional dependence of the universities at this level. The individual 
application for evaluation is voluntary and if the outcome is positive, the 
effect is a small permanent increase in the researcher salary (approx. 110 
euros/month gross, meaning approximately 3% of the total annual income). 
Other forms of institutional evaluation directed to the improvement of the 
management of R&D programs and research organisations had a marginal 
presence in mid-nineties. The CICYT did not included any formal or 
explicit decision to systematically perform program evaluation, and the 
same occurred with other R&D management bodies (Sanz-Menéndez, 
1995). A final type of evaluation developed during the nineties might be 
termed as “evaluative studies of R&D policies”. These were studies and 
research projects not formally commissioned, and not integrated or 
associated with the policy-making process, although some of them achieved 
informal acceptance and collaboration of the policy-making bodies, but with 
no commitment to implement the results. They were more academic 
exercises than proper research evaluations; their design did not provide clear 
definitions of the purpose or clear evaluative criteria, nor methodologies 
were well suited to generate policy feedback.  
In sum, formal research evaluation up to the mid-nineties was still 
developing. Peer review was the main method employed, which reflected 
the main role conferred to the “clients” of R&D policies. Additionally, 
evaluation was oriented mostly to ex ante evaluation for project funding 
purposes and individual research performance recognition linked to the 
provision of small salary increases for tenured researchers with significant 
reputational effects. On the other hand, organisational evaluation directed to 
strategic purposes constituted an exception in this context, where it appeared 
only under very exploratory actions with little practical consequences.  
3.2. New developments in the Spanish RES 
Two institutional developments have taken place over the last decade in the 
Spanish RES. In the first place, the emergence of systematic evaluations of 
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universities that focused on teaching quality rather than research, and did 
not have funding effects. The main instrument here has been the National 
Plan for Quality Assessment of Universities (PNECU). The PNECU was 
headed by the Council of Universities, an organisation composed of 
representatives of regional and national governments and the rectors of all 
universities. The process was managed by a Technical Committee, 
composed by Council’s officials and experts.  
The Plan started in 1996, following three more rounds (1998, 1999 and 
2000) before the 2001 Universities Act, when this type of evaluation was 
institutionalised. The underlying rationale was to detach the process of 
organisational evaluation from funding and accreditation, letting each 
university develop their own quality policies to improve their products and 
services (Bricall Report, 2000). The main objectives of the PNECU were: a) 
To promote the institutional assessment of university quality; b) to draw up 
homogeneous methods of assessing university quality in line with the 
practices currently used in the European Union; and c) to provide objective 
information which may be used by the various organisations to aid decision 
making in their particular area of expertise.13 The Plan evaluated three main 
activities: a) teaching in degree programs; b) research in the departments to 
which the programs were assigned; and c) management in the services 
attached to the programs. 
The methodology deployed by the PNECU consisted of a mixed system 
of self-assessment and external assessment, and, as a final step, the writing 
and publication of a final report. A major achievement of the Plan was to 
introduce and popularise the culture of evaluation among higher education 
agents. Almost all universities have participated in the Plan. Besides, the 
exercise also succeeded in establishing quality control units or departments 
in almost all universities, and significantly improved the information and 
statistical systems within the institutions. Although the Plan was more 
oriented to teaching activities than to research ones, research activities in 
universities were partially reviewed, paying attention to different 
institutional dimensions: scientific production, external relationships, human 
resources, support staff, economic resources, material resources and 
infrastructures, doctoral programs, research groups, university’s internal 
support for research, promotion activities, internal communication and 
collaboration, and departments’ internal promotion of research. 
The second important development within the 2001 Universities Act has 
been the extension or stretching of individual performance evaluation, 
which put into motion new recruitment procedures and quality requirements 
(accreditation and habilitation). Regarding the early stages of the academic 
career in public universities, the Act introduced some significant changes. It 
created new forms of pre-tenure teaching and research positions, and in 
                                                          
13 Art. 1 of the Decree, RD 1947/1995 of 1st December, establishing the PNECU. 
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order to get access to some of these contracts, candidates must previously be 
accredited by the appropriate agency. In this accreditation process, a body of 
experts assesses the research and teaching merits of the candidates.  
Additionally a quite complex system of national habilitation for getting 
the status of civil servant was established; once a year national habilitation 
exams were organized. The number of habilitations is determined by the 
demand of the universities. The universities set up access exams to their 
tenure positions and select among the candidates entitled. However, many 
universities do not issue the call until they have got their own temporary 
professors habilitated, maintaining some inbreeding practices.  
Both developments, the one related with “quality assurance and 
improvement” and the “individual national accreditation” have been 
associated to the creation, in the 2001 Universities Act, of a National 
Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation (ANECA). This agency, 
in addition to going on with the institutional quality assessment initiated 
with the PNECU, started the accreditations and evaluations for university 
teaching staff. Most interestingly it has performed a significant task in 
developing methodologies and publishing evaluation procedure manuals. 
Following this institutional innovation several regional similar agencies 
have been set up; any Spanish university can contract individuals accredited 
by the national agency, whereas individuals accredited by a regional agency 
can only be contracted by the universities located in the respective region. 
The consequences of this fragmentation and dualisation for the mobility and 
transparency of the academic labour market are still unclear. Nevertheless, 
habilitation, the official competitive evaluation required for university 
academic tenure, remains centralised as a reaction to the traditional high 
degree of inbreeding and low mobility of the research personnel.14 
Many regional authorities, more empowered with the 2001 Universities 
Act, have created new accreditation and quality assurance agencies, leading 
to the multiplication of evaluation structures. In 2005, 9 out 17 Regional 
authorities had set up university evaluation institutions.15 Two of them 
(Catalan and Andalusian) started to work in the context of the 
implementation of the PNECU, and the others in the context of the 2001 
Universities Act. These “agencies” have diverse legal status, with a 
                                                          
14 At the time of revising the paper in July 2006, the Spanish government has sent to the Parliament a new Act on 
Universities that introduces changes in the habilitation procedure, mainly its transformation into a simple 
national accreditation. 
15 These are: Andalusia (Agencia Andaluza de Evaluación -AGAE), Balearic Islands (Agència de Qualitat 
Universitària de les Isles Balears -AQUIB), Canary Islands (Agencia Canaria de Evaluación de la Calidad y 
Acreditación Universitaria -ACECAU), Castile-La Mancha (Agencia de Calidad Universitaria de Castilla-La-
Mancha -ACUCLM), Castile-León (Agencia para la Calidad del Sistema Universitario de Castilla y León -
ACSUCYL), Catalonia (L'Agència per a la Qualitat del Sistema Universitari a Catalunya -AQU), Galicia 
(Axencia para a Calidade do Sistema Universitario de Galicia -ACSUG), Madrid (Agencia de Calidad, 
Acreditación y Prospectiva de las Universidades de Madrid -ACAP) and Valencia (Comissió Valenciana 
d’Acreditació I Avaluació de la Qualitat -CVAEC). 
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dominant form of “consortium” between the universities and the regional 
government. 
Most of the agencies have been granted with broad competencies related 
to evaluation and quality assessment, and the most important are: 1) 
Institutional evaluation (which includes evaluation of academic programs, 
management and services, and academic and research functioning); 2) 
Accreditation and quality certification activities; 3) Individual evaluation 
(which includes teaching staff accreditation and research and academic 
teaching staff evaluation in order to get regional salary bonuses); 4) 
Assistance and advice related activities (including policy planning). 
However, in practice, most of the activities of the regional evaluation 
agencies have focused on just two missions: individual evaluation16 and 
some institutional assessment related with the quality of the teaching 
activities and services. An emerging field is the preparation of the changes 
associated to the implementation of the European Higher Education Space. 
In accounting for these developments, two main factors are important. 
First, the expansion of undergraduate education has been the driver of the 
growth of universities in the last twenty years, and this explains partly the 
focus of the evaluation exercises on teaching quality rather than on research. 
Secondly, in explaining the multiplicity of evaluation structures, the most 
important factor has been the growth of the research system. This growth, in 
terms of research centres, laboratories and researchers, contributed to the 
overload of the national system for evaluation and to the conditions in 
which some regional authorities created regional evaluation structures in 
support of their local scientific policies. Regional governments have 
consolidated as active new actors in the system, contributing, very 
significantly, to R&D expenditures vis a vis the central state.  
Compared with 1995, there are not only more researchers, but also more 
funds coming from national, regional, and supranational R&D institutions. 
Thus, the growth in demand has been sustained by the multiplication of 
financing sources. Funding models and evaluation practices have been 
diffused or imitated across levels and among regions. Accepted national 
practices have diffused quite widely, despite the fact that some 
experimentation and new developments have emerged in some regions.17 In 
a few cases, this has even led to the duplication of evaluation institutions, 
since, for example, some regions have set up their own research 
                                                          
16 The main activity of these agencies has been the individual evaluation of university teaching staff. This kind of 
evaluation has been oriented towards two main tasks: the recruitment of new teaching staff according to the new 
categories included in the 2001 Universities Act; and the allocation of regional salary bonuses. According to the 
available data, the evaluation and accreditation of teaching staff is the only activity performed by all the 
agencies. Moreover, the lack of common standards in the evaluation criteria threatens to jeopardize the meaning 
of accreditation itself. 
17 For example, the Catalan Government has also promoted a non for profit institution ICREA that is playing a 
critical role in the improvement of the quality of the Catalan system with prices and grants, but again the focus 
has been the selection of the best individuals, not the change of organizational practices. 
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performance based salary bonuses, applicable only to the academics in the 
universities located in their regions.  
4. FEEDBACK EFFECTS BETWEEN EVALUATION AND 
RESEARCH SYSTEMS 
Evaluation occupies a substantial part of the new discourse adopted by 
Spanish research actors, but assessment practices have not been fully 
consolidated, specially at the organizational level. Overall, the research 
evaluation activities performed by the ANEP and the CNEAI, mostly related 
to project and individual research performance evaluation, continue to be 
the key elements of the Spanish system. The balance of our analysis can be 
summarised as follows. 
First, in the context of the increasing intervention of regional authorities 
in S&T policy, research funding schemes based on competitive project 
funding have proliferated in Spain. In this context, pluralism has increased. 
As a result of the regional governments support of their own centres and 
universities, we are probably moving from a public research system largely 
based on “competitive pluralism” to one more composed of “competitive 
hierarchies” (Whitley, 2003). 
Due to the regionalisation of S&T policies, a major response from the 
part of the regional governments as actors in the system has been the setting 
up of parallel funding and evaluation structures. The result has been the 
diversification of external sources for project funding and ex ante evaluation 
structures. The outcome of this process has been the multiplication of 
evaluation standards and criteria for project funding.  
The regional authorities' involvement in the S&T policy domain and the 
creation of regional research evaluation structures have resulted in an 
increased fragmentation of the RES considered as a whole. Regional 
governments have developed their own R&D policies autonomously from 
national authorities, and this has prompted the proliferation of several 
regional public research systems, each of them with the capacity to establish 
their own criteria for allocating funds or designing programs. The existence 
of regional evaluation structures parallel to national ones, using different 
standards and criteria, might create problems of dualisation of “markets” 
and legitimacy deficits. Due to the decentralisation processes and the 
multiplication of funding and evaluation structures, our prediction is that 
some of the regional subsystems will evolve into stronger RES and some of 
them will not, depending, largely, on the relative weight of academic elites 
into the policy decision-making processes. 
Second, the consolidation and deepening of individual researchers’ 
evaluations has become established as a core practice in the Spanish RES. 
The model developed in the late eighties and early nineties that focused on 
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rewarding the research performance and granting reputation to the 
researchers has become a “generalised practice” at national and regional 
levels. Most of the Regional Governments have created their own reward 
systems to provide some additional income to their researchers. Moreover, 
the requirements for  accreditation for the entry phases of the academic 
career, and the habilitation for the consolidation of tenure, have become 
generalised across the system. Accordingly, the implementation of the 
accreditation has been duplicated by nine regions that have also created their 
own accreditation and quality assurance entities. 
Third, although the activities of ANECA and the regional entities in the 
domain of institutional evaluation, certification, etc. have grown in the past 
years, in almost no Region has a “research performance evaluation” has 
been linked to the funding regime of universities and public research 
organizations. The models used for university core funding are slowly 
evolving into “contract agreement” types, but based on output indicators and 
not on research assessment. 
This brief summary leads us to the exploration of the way in which those 
practices of research evaluation are affecting various dimensions of the 
organisational field of universities and similar organisations, and the public 
research system as a whole. Although the specific arrangements for RES in 
Spain are in transition, their processes and procedures have started to 
produce feedback effects in the public research system. For the sake of 
clarity we can distinguish between direct and indirect effects.  
Direct effects are consequences that result from legal regulations, 
organizational procedures, norms and routines, mainly related to funding 
mechanisms and the functioning of the labour market for researchers. There 
are also indirect effects that result from the legitimation and reputation 
dynamics that increasing information and transparency over the system are 
producing. These types of mechanisms produce long term effects in the 
overall system. 
Regarding direct effects, the most important one relates to funding 
distribution. Together with the financial weakness of Spanish universities, 
the research evaluation procedures embedded in the competitive project 
funding model, have both created a strong dependence of researchers and 
research groups on external funding sources and differentiated research 
groups in terms of resources and prestige. Additionally, the limited funds of 
universities and other research organisations reduces significantly the 
authority of the managers and academic authorities over researchers and 
research groups, who are highly autonomous in their decisions and in 
pursuing their research objectives. Universities and traditional public 
research organizations are more “confederations” based in distributive 
coalitions of individuals, departments, institutes or schools, rather than as 
unitary strategic actors.  
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The second relevant direct effect relates to staff recruitment and research 
career management. Before the 2001 reforms’ universities had in their hands 
almost the complete control and autonomy for the selection and 
appointment of teaching and research staff. In parallel, a nation wide 
individual performance evaluation system (CNEAI) was established, 
providing some additional personal income and establishing a formal 
reputation system. A long debate in the nineties about the negative 
consequences of inbreeding for the quality control of the new university 
professors and lecturers created the conditions for the 2001 legal reforms. 
External evaluation of individual curricula has now become embedded in 
the new hiring and promotion procedures. The legal and normative changes 
in the requirements for contracting university pre-tenured and tenured staff 
have had an impact as regards quality control at the entry point of the 
academic labour market.  
Some of these effects are contradictory to some extent because, on the 
one hand, the system has advanced into a more extensive and deeper 
development of the individual researchers evaluation, by means of 
accreditation and habilitation as legal requirements to be contracted or 
tenured by any university; but on the other hand, due to the proliferation of 
principals of research (regional authorities) and the available funding 
sources, scientists find less pressure for resource competition. 
Finally another direct effect of the individual evaluation principles was 
built in the 2001 Universities Act that introduced a provision whereby only 
professors with positively evaluated research periods by CNEAI (1 or 2 
depending on the categories) could be members of the selecting committees 
for the habilitation processes. This regulation has left out of the selection 
system more of the 40% of the tenured professors, with variations across 
scientific fields.  
There are also some indirect effects at the aggregated level that result 
from the increasing information within the research system. In particular, 
the use of data from individual research performance evaluation (CNEAI) in 
aggregated form has begun to affect collective reputations. Since academics 
with rejections in their “CNEAI sexenios” are not well considered by their 
colleagues, individual information has become almost secret, private 
information, affecting the individual rights. However, the information has 
increasingly been aggregated by institutions and scientific fields, and some 
data about the quality or excellence of universities and CSIC, resulting from 
the evaluation of their tenured professors and researchers, have become 
available in some publications similar to rankings (MEC, 2004). 
At the aggregated level the CNEAI system has had some further effects. 
The use of standard academic criteria, mainly based on international 
scientific publications, has produced a slow change –but clearly shaped- in 
the publications’ pattern of Spanish academics. The impact of the CNEAI 
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system has been a significant and continuous growth, in the recent years, of 
the Spanish share of the ISI-Thomson databases (Jimenez-Contreras, et al. 
2003); this processes are similar to those described in other countries that 
use formula funding associated to publications included in the ISI-Thomson 
database (Butler, 2003; Gläser and Laudel in this volume). 
It is also interesting to note that bibliometric indicators, even if they were 
not developed in Spain in the context of direct evaluation exercises but more 
often in the context of bibliometric research, have had a strong indirect 
impact on the informal “reputational market” of academic science. In this 
direction some public agencies have recently promoted the systematic 
analysis of the Spanish bibliometric domain, by fields and institutions, to 
publish rankings (FECYT, 2005). 
These dynamics are also related with the most significant process in the 
system: differentiation, which is increasing due to the project-based nature 
of the research-funding regime. These differentiation effects operate, on the 
one hand, among research groups by their relative levels of competitive 
external funding acquisition, and on the other hand, among the individual 
researchers by the relative recognition of positively evaluated research 
performance periods.  
In contrast to the research group and individual researcher level, we find 
only a marginal degree of differentiation among the research organisational 
level, that is, among universities and research centres. The fact that 
organisational evaluation as it has been designed and performed is not 
linked to funding decisions is only part of the explanation. Research 
evaluation as a tool for strategic planning and management improvement, is 
advancing very slowly. Although there is a new emphasis on institutional 
assessment in universities, the national organisational evaluations set into 
motion during the period studied have not emphasised research activities 
and, at the sub-national level, regional institutions have followed a similar 
pattern.  
Increasing the differentiation and specialization of universities and 
research organizations will require, in addition to the indirect reputational 
effects, a change in the funding system of research, creating mechanisms to 
assess the collective research performance and linking it to differentiated 
funding. Additionally the emergence of new types of research institutions in 
the organizational field, as reported in Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez 
(2007), could increase the level of competition between organizations 
favouring the differentiation and specialization process. 
If new funding instruments are developed to shape the organisational 
behaviour, for instance by hiring people with research profiles, we could 
witness the emergence of more institutionally-oriented research 
performance evaluation. Alternatively the development or reinforcement of 
new models of funding based on contract agreements could help on the 
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development of institutionally focused soft type of research evaluation, as 
usually implied in the strategic plans models. Overall, though, the recent 
trends have reduced the ability of national R&D authorities to steer the 
system as a whole, because of the increasing pluralism in terms of funding 
sources.  
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